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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHAYNE E. TODD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030157-CA 
Defendant/Appellant Shayne Todd is appealing from a judgment of conviction for 
murder. He maintains that during closing argument at trial in this case, the prosecutor en-
gaged in misconduct. The prosecutor urged jurors to consider what the victim, Stephanie 
Todd, would have said at trial if she were able to testify, and the prosecutor advised jurors 
to convict Todd of murder even without evidence of the gun, based on the fact that Todd 
did not stop the truck when Stephanie grabbed onto it as Todd drove away. The prosecu-
tor's statements were improper and prejudicial. (Brief of Appellant, November 5, 2003.) 
In response to Todd's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the state has made pro-
cedural arguments. The state asserts that Todd's trial counsel "invited the error he claims 
arose from the prosecutor's remarks." (See State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief), 17, 
26-28.) Yet, the invited-error doctrine does not apply here. The state also claims that after 
Todd objected to the prosecutor's improper closing argument, he then was required to 
object to the trial court's ruling regarding a curative instruction. (State's Brief, 37; kL 35-
38.) Yet, Todd did all that he was required to do to preserve the issue here. Todd has 
addressed those arguments below. See infra. Argument, sub-part A. 
With regard to the merits, the state seems to claim that the prosecutor's closing 
argument constituted permissible inferences based on the evidence. (See State's Brief, 
29-32.) The state has provided no relevant citations to the record and no legal analysis to 
support its claim. (Id.) Also, while the state seems to argue that the evidence here was 
susceptible to differing or "conflicting]" interpretations (see id., 31), it also claims that 
for purposes of the prejudice analysis, the evidence was undisputed and/or sufficient to 
support the murder conviction. (Id., 40-43.) Yet, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard 
is "not the standard by which harmless error determinations are made." State v. Mitchell 
779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). Rather, the reviewing court is to decide whether, 
absent the misconduct, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have resolved 
the differing interpretations of the evidence in a manner more favorable to the defendant. 
Todd has made that showing. (Brief of Appellant, Argument, sub-part C.) 
Finally, with regard to the timeliness of Todd's Notice of Appeal, the state main-
tains the appeal must be dismissed. In support of that argument, the state cites to State v. 
Price [aka Peece], 2002 UT App 338, an unpublished decision, and asks this Court to take 
judicial notice of disputed facts not discussed in Price. (State's Brief, 10-12.) That would 
be improper. In addition, the Price case is not controlling authority for the issue here. 
This Court should find that Todd's Notice of Appeal was timely and properly filed. 
For the reasons set forth below, and for the reasons more fully set forth in Toddfs 
Brief of Appellant, Todd respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and 
judgment for murder, and remand the case for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT REQUIRES REVERSAL HERE. 
A. THE STATE'S PROCEDURAL CLAIMS. 
The state claims the invited-error doctrine applies here, and it claims that defense 
counsel was required to object repeatedly to the trial court's ruling to preserve the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct for appeal. (State's Brief, 26-28, 37.) Todd responds to the 
state's arguments as follows. 
1. For Invited Error, the Complaining Party Must Affirmatively Endorse Error. 
During closing argument in this case, the prosecutor made remarks that called the 
attention of jurors to circumstances they were not justified in considering to reach a 
verdict. Specifically, the prosecutor made references to what Stephanie would have said 
if she were able to testify at trial. (R. 676:25-29.) That was improper. 
Also, the prosecutor advised jurors to find Todd guilty of murder even without the 
evidence of the gunshot wound. According to the prosecutor, jurors could render a mur-
der conviction if they found that Todd drove "across the parking lot with a young woman 
hanging on the outside of his car and him pushing her off of the car"; if they found that 
Todd "merely" pushed Stephanie "with the gun," without more. (See R. 676: 21, 23.) 
The statements were improper. Todd objected. The court denied the objection. (R. 
676:30-33.) Todd has raised the issues here. He maintains the trial court erred. 
In response, the state asserts that for appellate review, the record must support a 
"timely objection in the trial court to enable the trial judge to act upon the claim and cure 
3 • 
the problem, if appropriate." (State's Brief, 26.) In this case, defense counsel objected at 
trial on the heels of the prosecutor's statements, thereby giving the trial court the oppor-
tunity to act on the matter. (R. 676:25-33.) That was proper. (Brief of Appellant, pages 
39-42); see Commonwealth v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800, 803 & n.3 (Pa. 1977) (where 
prosecutor made argument on the second day of trial, and defense counsel objected on the 
third, the court had adequate opportunity to correct the misconduct); Salt Lake City v. 
Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (th e preservation rule ensures that 
matters are brought to the trial court's attention in order that the court may resolve them). 
The state does not claim that Todd's objections were untimely here. Rather, the 
state claims that Todd invited the error. (State's Brief, 17, 26-28.) The invited-error 
doctrine is not applicable to this case. 
Invited error applies when the party complaining about the trial court's ruling {i.e., 
the appellant) affirmatively "encourage[s] or prompt[s] the trial court to make the 
erroneous ruling" below. See Black's Law Dictionary, 563 (7th ed. 1999). 
In State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 86 P.3d 742, the supreme court specified 
that invited-error occurs when trial counsel engages in an affirmative statement or act 
that endorses or actively confirms the trial court ruling. See id at [^9. There, defense 
counsel proposed an instruction similar to the erroneous instruction used by the court at 
trial. Id at Tfl|5-6. The supreme court determined that defendant invited error; his 
proposed instruction "effectively led the trial court into adopting the erroneous jury 
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instruction that [the defendant] now challenges on appeal." IcL_ at *fll2. The court stated, 
"[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error/' State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 
(Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)) (internal 
quotation omitted). Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be assigned as error 
even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice ff if counsel, either by state-
ment or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection 
to the jury instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, P54, 70 P.3d 111. 
We have recognized a number of ways in which a defendant has led a trial 
court into committing error. In Hamilton, for instance, a defendant invited error 
where his counsel confirmed on the record that the defense had no objection to 
the instructions given by the trial court. Id. at [^55. In Anderson, a defendant 
likewise invited error when he failed to object to an instruction when specifically 
queried by the court. 929 P.2d at 1108-09. In State v. Medina, a defendant 
invited error when his counsel actively represented to the trial court that she had 
read the instruction and had no objection to it. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). 
Geukgeuzian. 2004 UT 16,1ffl9-10 (emphasis added); s_ee also State v. Laffertv. 2001 UT 
19, |^34 n.9, 20 P.3d 342 (under invited-error, a party may not "take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error"), cert, 
denied. 534 U.S. 1018 (2001); State v. Chapoose. 1999 UT 83, ffi|7-8, 985 P.2d 915 ("we 
will not permit a party to claim error at the trial level when the party asserting the error 
led the trial court to commit it"); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) 
(same); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Betha . 957 
P.2d 611,617 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In order for the invited-error doctrine to apply here, the record would have to sup-
port that Todd's counsel actively or affirmatively embraced the misconduct and encou-
raged the trial court to rule against him on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. See 
Geukgeuzian. 2004 UT 16,1HJ9-12. The record here does not support that determination. 
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After the prosecutor made improper statements in closing argument, defense counsel im-
mediately asked for a recess, and then objected to the prosecutor's statements outside the 
jury's presence. (R. 676: 30-32.) Counsel argued that the prosecutor's closing statements 
constituted misconduct requiring a new trial. (IdJ The court considered the objections 
and ruled on the merits. (IdL at 33.) In this case, "[t]here was no invited error". 
Chapoose, 1999 UT 83, ^ 8. This Court may consider the merits of the issue on appeal. 
2. Repeated Objections Are Not Necessary to Preserve the Issue for Appeal 
Todd's original objection on the heels of the misconduct served the function of 
preserving the issue for appeal. (R. 676:29-32.) The state disagrees; it asserts that after 
the court ruled, Todd was required to object to the ruling regarding the limited curative 
instruction. (State's Brief, 37.) Yet, the record and the law do not support that assertion. 
According to the law, once a party has made his initial objection to the matter with 
the reasons therefore, and the trial court rules, the party is not required then to object 
again when the matter is presented to the jury. See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 649 
(Utah 1989) (stating that once a defendant makes a motion to suppress evidence and the 
trial court rules, defendant is not required to object or to renew the motion when the issue 
is before the jury); Utah R. Crim. P. 20 (2004) ("[exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court are unnecessary"). 
In this case, Todd made his objections to the prosecutor's misconduct during clo-
sing argument in sufficient time to allow the trial court to rule on the matter. (R. 676:30-
32.) In connection with the objections counsel asked the court to declare a mistrial. (Id.) 
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The trial court considered the objections, denied the requests on the merits, and 
ruled that it would give a limited curative instruction. The court stated that it would "in-
struct the [ljury after [defendant's] closing and [the prosecutor's] rebuttal." (R. 676:33.) 
The ruling supports that the trial court did not intend the limited instruction to relate to the 
prosecutor's misconduct — either in terms of timing or content. (Id.) That is, although 
defense counsel's objections were made in sufficient time for the court to address the 
matter, the court ruled it would provide a general instruction to the jury later. The court 
determined not to admonish the prosecutor in connection with the improper comments, 
and it determined not to explicitly instruct the jury to disregard the "totally and absolutely 
inappropriate" comments by the prosecutor. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 270-71 
(Utah 1998) (approving of curative instruction there); id. at 271-72 (citing, inter alia, 
U.S. v. Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] prompt and effective 
admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial judge may effectively 
'neutralize the damage'"); U.S. v. Diaz-Carreon. 915 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(court's strong curative instruction and condemnation of prosecutor's tactics neutralized 
damaging effect of improper remarks)). The court then stated, "you've made your record 
and your motion is denied." (R. 676:33.) 
Once the court ruled, Todd was required to proceed with the matter in the face of 
the ruling. See Holtman, 806 P.2d at 237 & n.2 (recognizing that once the court has 
ruled on an objection/motion, it is properly preserved; counsel is then expected to pro-
ceed in the face of that ruling); State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, ffi[19-20, 4 P.3d 795 (after 
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trial court ruling, defendant proceeded with the matter in light of the ruling; that did not 
constitute waiver of the issue). He was not required to object again. Utah R. Crim. P. 20. 
Later in the proceedings, the court provided the limited curative instruction (R. 
676:84-85) as it previously ruled. (R. 676:33). Since Todd's counsel had already objected 
when the prosecutorial misconduct occurred, counsel was not required to do more. See 
Bruce, 779 P.2d at 649. This Court now may address the issue on the merits. 
B. ON THE MERITS, THE STATE SEEMS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR DID NOT KNOW HOW STEPHANIE WOULD HAVE 
DESCRIBED EVENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE STATE REFERS TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS AS A "PRESENTATION OF THE VICTIM'S 
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY." 
1. The State Has Not Cited to any Case That Would Permit a Party to Present a 
Non-witness's nAnticipated" "Version of Events" in Order to Bolster the Party's 
Case in Closing Argument, 
The prosecutor in this case engaged in misconduct in closing argument when she 
argued that Stephanie would have told jurors that events transpired in this case in a way 
that would support the state's theory. (R. 676:25-29.) The prosecutor's statements were 
improper. Stephanie's version of events was not in the record. (See record, generally.) 
A prosecutor is "precluded from arguing matters not in evidence." State v. Hop-
kins. 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989); State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (where the prosecutor's closing argument asks the jury to consider matters outside 
the evidence, that constitutes misconduct), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); Com, 
v. Harvell 327 A.2d 27 (Pa. 1974) (ruling that prosecutor's references to what the victim 
would have said, among other things, were improper; they were not in the record). 
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A prosecutor is prohibited from using argument calculated to inflame the passions 
or prejudices of the jury. See ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function, § 3-5.8(c). Such arguments are irrelevant and irrational to our system of justice. 
"Statements which suggest that a jury has an obligation to convict a defendant on some 
basis other than solely on the evidence before it are improper and beyond the broad lati-
tude allowed in closing argument." State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
A prosecutor may not ask jurors to put themselves in the victim's place. Cherry, 378 A.2d 
at 803. And a prosecutor may not request revenge for the victim. The state does not 
dispute the law as it relates to improper closing argument. (State's Brief, 17-3.) 
Here, the prosecutor served as the unsworn surrogate for Stephanie. (R. 676:25-
29 (repeatedly claiming that Stephanie "would have told you", and she "would tell you").) 
Indeed, the state describes the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury as a "presentation 
of the victim's version of events" and a "presentation of the victim's anticipated 
testimony." (State's Brief, 29 (emphasis added), 18.) Those characterizations support 
that the state intended the prosecutor's references to carry weight with the jury.1 
1 The state suggests that Todd has challenged only two comments in the prosecutor's 
closing. The state asserts, "when [Todd] claims that the statements attributed to 
Stephanie 'were inappropriate, insupportable embellishments' which 'clouded the factual 
issues[,]' he offers only two examples: 1) 'that Stephanie surely would have liked to have 
sat down with the investigators and spent four or five hours telling them her version of 
what happened that night' and 2) 'Stephanie would have liked to have come into this 
courtroom and told you what happened that night.'" (State's Brief, 30.) 
Yet, the state does not seriously consider Todd's challenge to be so narrow. (See 
State's Brief, 18-22 (recognizing that defendant's challenge is to the entire argument), 29 
(referring to the "fifteen allegedly objectionable" statements identified in Todd's brief).) 
Indeed, the Brief of Appellant supports that Todd has challenged the prosecutor's state-
9 
The state also asserts that "[n]one of the statements in the relevant section of the 
prosecutor's remarks were statements attributed at trial to Stephanie." (State's Brief, 30.) 
That is true, and it is also what makes the statements objectionable: a party is precluded 
in closing argument from making representations as to what a non-witness would have 
said since such representations are not in the record, not attributed to any trial witness, 
and not tested in the adversarial trial process. A prosecutor's references to statements 
that are not attributed to a trial witness serve to inflame the jury's passions and to place 
matters not in evidence before the jury. See. State v. Leon, 945 P.2d 1290, 1293-94 
(Ariz. 1997) (a prosecutor's references to reports not in evidence constituted error). 
Indeed, the state's claim - on the one hand — that it would be "reasonable to 
believe that the victim would have" testified in a manner to support the state's theory of 
events (State's Brief, 30 (the prosecutor "inferred that Stephanie would have agreed with 
that version of the evidence"), 31), and its claim — on the other hand - that the prosecutor 
did not have knowledge of what Stephanie's "testimony would have been" (State's Brief, 
31), support the error. The prosecutor was not justified in making statements about what 
Stephanie "would have" said, because Stephanie was not a witness, and the prosecutor 
had no knowledge of what Stephanie's "testimony would have been." (See 
ments regarding Stephanie's version of events in its entirety. (See Brief of Appellant, 
pages 14-36.). The two comments referenced above and identified in the state's brief 
(State's Brief, 30) simply reflect — in the prosecutor's own words — that the prosecutor 
was not satisfied with discussing the trial evidence from the standpoint of the state, but 
rather, the prosecutor intended to deliver Stephanie's purported message to the jury. The 
prosecutor claimed that Stephanie "would have" made specific statements to investigators 
and jurors. Those claims are not supported by the record. 
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id.) Given the circumstances, the prosecutor's references could not be supported by the 
record. They were improper and fundamentally unfair. 
Consider this: If the prosecutor's statements were deemed to be proper, what 
would prevent defense counsel in closing argument from claiming that an alibi witness, 
who died, would have made statements consistent with defendant's testimony? What 
function would the truth-seeking process serve in that scenario? What function does the 
trial process and the right to cross-examination serve in the situation here? The prosecu-
tor's improper argument at trial served to undermine the very purpose of the right to trial. 
The state also seems to argue that the prosecutor merely recited evidence and 
made inferences about the facts during closing argument. (State's Brief, 29-31.) The state 
has failed to include any relevant citation to the record in support of its assertions. (See 
id., where the state cites once to the evidentiary transcripts at 671:564; 673:789; 674: 
1044-45, 1048, 1054, which supports that Todd cooperated with police.) Also, the state 
has cited to State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1992), cerL denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993), and State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991), without relevant 
analysis.2 (See State's Brief, 29-31.) That is insufficient. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), (b). 
2 The state claims that where "the evidence conflicted below," the prosecutor was 
allowed to present her view of that evidence. (See State's Brief, 31.) In connection with 
that assertion, the state has cited to Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 854, and Day, 815 P.2d 
1345, 1350. Those cases support that a party may discuss conflicting interpretations of the 
evidence from his/her standpoint at trial. 
In this case, the prosecutor did not simply discuss the evidence from her 
standpoint: she argued facts not in evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor claimed that 
Stephanie would have presented a version of the events relating to February 28, 1999, that 
would support the state's theory for murder. (R. 676:25-29.) That claim is not supported 
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The prosecutor's references to what Stephanie "would have" said were improper. 
(Brief of Appellant, pages 14-36.) Where the prosecutor claimed Stephanie would have 
said she was angry that Todd returned her purse without the money (R. 676:27), that is 
insupportable. (R. 669:132, 134.) Where the prosecutor claimed, inter alia, that 
Stephanie would have said she regretted her decision to grab the Blazer as Todd drove 
away, she was frightened, she was afraid to let go of the truck, she feared for her life, she 
screamed at the defendant, and she begged him to stop the truck (R. 676:28), those claims 
are insupportable. (See R. 669:54, 85, 98 (witnesses in the parking lot heard nothing 
from Stephanie); 670:269 (Stephanie had methamphetamine in her system).) 
Where the prosecutor claimed that Stephanie would have said she did not reach 
for the gun, and she felt Todd press the gun against her head (R. 676:28-29), the record 
supports that Todd did not put the gun to her head. Stephanie grabbed the gun from 
Todd's lap. (R. 673:777-780 (Todd tried to take the gun from Stephanie); 669:191 (Troy 
Roberts did not see the gun in Todd's hand before it discharged).) The physical evidence 
supported Todd's testimony. (See R. 674:949-50, 954-55, 959 (tear on Stephanie's hand 
was consistent with her hand on the barrel as it discharged); 674:1036-37 (evidence 
supported a palm print on the gun barrel).) 
The references to what Stephanie would have said were meant to invoke the jury's 
by the record. The prosecutor had no knowledge of what Stephanie would have said or 
that it would have been consistent in any respect with the state's theory. 
Indeed, where the facts here support Todd's rendition of events, it is just as likely 
that Stephanie would have acknowledged that her bizarre actions escalated the matter in 
the parking lot that night and caused the shooting. 
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sympathy, and to encourage the jury to exact revenge. The statements served to encourage 
the jury to render a verdict based on emotion rather than the facts, and they called matters 
not in evidence to the jury's attention. That was improper. (See. supra, pages 8-9, herein.) 
With respect to the prosecutor's claim that jurors could convict Todd of murder 
even if "all [they] had were the defendant driving across the parking lot with a young 
woman hanging on the outside of his car and him pushing her off of the car" (R. 676:23, 
21), the state acknowledges the prosecutor urged jurors to consider "intent" in an isolated 
manner, without "the remaining elements." (State's Brief, 33.) That was improper. 
This case concerned a gunshot wound resulting in death. (R. 670:277 (Stephanie 
died from a gunshot wound).) The bruises and abrasions that Stephanie suffered from the 
fall did not relate to her death. (R. 670:241, 277.) Thus, in this case, if "all [the jurors] 
had were the defendant driving across the parking lot" with Stephanie hanging on and 
"him pushing her off," that would not support that Todd caused her death. (See Brief of 
Appellant, pages 26-28); see State v. Dumas. 721 P.2d 502, 503-05 (Utah 1986) (evi-
dence of intent supported attempted murder, where acts did not result in victim's death). 
To find murder, the jury had to consider whether Todd intentionally caused the 
gunshot wound for serious bodily injury, whether he intentionally caused Stephanie's 
death by gunshot, or whether he demonstrated depraved indifference, causing death by 
gunshot. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. The jury was required to consider intent in the con-
text of the cause of death. The prosecutor's argument misstated the law. It was improper. 
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2. The State Acknowledges that the Evidence Was Susceptible to Differing 
Interpretations. That Supports Prejudice, 
In connection with its argument on the merits, the state acknowledges that the 
evidence in this case was susceptible to differing interpretations. (See State's Brief, 31 
(asserting that "where the evidence conflicted below," the prosecutor presented her 
view).) That supports the prejudice prong, requiring reversal. 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such 
cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of 
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403. 
The state also asserts that "ample" "undisputed" facts support the verdict, although 
the parties viewed those facts "differently." (State's Brief, 40.) By that assertion, the 
state seems to invoke application of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence doctrine here. The 
Utah Supreme Court has rejected application of that doctrine to the prejudice analysis. In 
Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, the court ruled that sufficiency of the evidence "is not the 
standard by which harmless error determinations are to be made. Rather, the reviewing 
court is to decide whether, considering all the evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury would have decided the case differently." Id. at 1122. "The reasonable 
likelihood question is not just the substantial evidence test in disguise; rather, it focuses 
on the taint caused by the error. If the taint is sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is 
sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict." Id. (cites omitted). 
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The facts in this case support prejudice. That is, absent the prosecutor's improper 
statements, the jury here likely would have resolved the case in a way more favorable to 
Todd. The jury would have convicted him of something other than first degree murder. 
See Mitchell 779 P.2d at 1122. The evidence supported the following: 
- Although Todd and Stephanie, were separated (R. 669:37), Todd left his Blazer 
with Stephanie. (R. 673:751-52.) 
- Stephanie obtained a loan against Todd's Blazer. (R. 669: 41, 129.) Todd did 
not like how Stephanie treated the Blazer, so he took it without Stephanie's 
permission on February 28, 1999. (R. 671:463-64; 673:752-54.) 
- When Stephanie discovered the Blazer gone, she was upset. She wanted her pro-
perty (including her purse and money) returned to her. Todd was agreeable to that. 
Stephanie arranged to meet Todd that evening for the property exchange. Todd 
did not intend to return the Blazer to Stephanie. (R. 669:40-41, 129; 678:829.) 
- Todd made arrangements to meet John Dinga at a Texaco station that same 
evening to return Dinga's property from the Blazer. (R. 672:687; 673:759-62, 827, 
829-30.) Todd was afraid of Dinga and Troy Roberts (R. 673:768); they had 
threatened Todd earlier. (See R. 673:741-43, 798, 814, 929, 931.) Todd brought a 
gun to the Texaco. Dinga did not show up at the Texaco. (R. 673:764-65, 831-
32.) 
- Todd drove from the Texaco station to a Wal-Mart parking lot in anticipation of 
his meeting with Stephanie. He was supposed to meet Stephanie at the Hometown 
Buffet parking lot. He waited across the street at the Wal-Mart. (R. 673:769.) 
- Stephanie arranged for Dinga and Roberts to be at the Wal-Mart parking lot 
during her meeting with Todd. (See R. 669:181-82.) 
- Stephanie and Kelly Oliver drove to the Hometown Buffet parking lot and 
noticed the Blazer across the street in front of the Wal-Mart. (R. 669:129-31.) 
They crossed the street and pulled up to the Blazer. (R. 669:131, 146.) 
- As Stephanie and Kelly pulled up to the Blazer, Todd did not know who they 
were. (R. 673:772-73, 839-40.) He thought it might be Dinga and Roberts. (R. 
673: 840.) He placed the loaded gun in his lap. (R. 673:840.) 
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- Stephanie got out of the car and walked over to the Blazer. Todd handed her 
purse to Kelly. Stephanie began to argue with Todd. (R. 669:132-33.) She tried to 
jump onto the Blazer. (R. 673:775, 848-49.) Todd began to drive away. Even 
though the Blazer had high suspension (R. 673:852) and no running boards (R. 
673:883), Stephanie jumped back onto the Blazer (R. 673:775) and wrapped her 
left arm around the steering column. (See R. 670:323; 673:776-77, 849.) 
- Stephanie had intoxicating amounts of methamphetamine in her system. (R. 
670:269.) 
- Todd told Stephanie he had a gun. (R. 673:859.) 
- The gun was in Todd's lap. (See R. 669:191-92 (Roberts did not see a gun in 
Todd's hand); 673:778-80.) Stephanie grabbed it. Todd tried to take the gun from 
her. (Id) 
- Stephanie continued to hold onto the gun when it discharged. The physical 
evidence supported that Stephanie was gripping the port of the gun with her right 
hand when it discharged. (R. 674:949-952, 954-55, 959; also 674:1036-37.) 
Stephanie fell from the truck. (R. 673:780.) 
- Todd was scared. (R. 673:780, 861.) He left the parking lot and called several 
people. (R. 673:781,783-88.) 
- Officers arrested Todd at his brother-in-law's house in Sunset, Utah, the next 
morning. He was cooperative and emotional. (R. 671:559, 563-64.) He spoke to 
police about the incident. (R. 673:790-91, 892-93, 895, 897-99.) 
Absent the prosecutorial misconduct in this case, the evidence supports the 
likelihood that the jury would have found Todd guilty of a lesser offense: reckless 
manslaughter or negligent homicide. (R. 481-83; 488-91 (jury was instructed on reckless 
manslaughter and negligent homicide).) In this case, the jury was improperly influenced 
by the prosecutor's misleading statements and references to evidence not in the record. 
See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87. The prosecutor used manipulative tactics to divert the 
jury's attention from the pivotal issues by structuring an unsworn statement for Stephanie 
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to bolster the state's case and to conflict with Todd's testimony of the events. ABA Stds 
Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function: §3-5.8, commentary (a 
prosecutor's closing argument must be consistent with the evidence; juries will give 
special weight to the prosecutor's argument, because of the prestige associated with the 
office, and the fact-finding facilities "presumably available to the office"). The 
misconduct prejudiced Todd. He respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
C. FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS SUPPORTS THE DETERMINATION THAT 
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THIS CASE WAS TIMELY. 
1. The Timeliness of Todd's Notice of Appeal Is Supported by the Plain Language 
of the Rule, Consideration of Comparable Rules, Case Law, and Public Policy. 
Todd maintains that the notice of appeal in this case was properly filed. Pursuant 
to Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P., a timely motion for a new trial will toll the time for filing 
the notice of appeal. Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah R. Crim. P., a new trial motion must 
be filed "within 10 days after imposition of sentence." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) (2004). In 
this case, Todd was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term on March 14, 2001, 
commitment to issue forthwith. (R. 678:19 (March 14, 2001 sentencing)). 
On March 22, 2001, Todd filed a motion for a new trial. (R. 516-18.) The motion 
was filed within 10 days after the imposition of the sentence. On March 28, 2001, the 
trial court executed the judgment, setting forth Todd's guilty plea to count II (dated 
November 16, 2000), the verdict on count I (dated January 23, 2001), and the sentence 
from March 14, 2001. (R. 685.) Thereafter, a court reporter prepared the transcripts of 
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the proceedings (see R. 559-565), and the parties filed papers in connection with the new 
trial motion. (R. 531-552; 568-571.) In August 2002, the court conducted a hearing on 
the motion for a new trial. (See R. 590-591.) The court denied the motion and ordered 
the state to prepare findings and an order. (Id.) The state presented the order several 
months later, and on January 23, 2003, the court executed the order. (R. 592-94.) On 
February 21, 2003, Todd filed a notice of appeal. (R. 632-33.) 
Since the new trial motion was filed pursuant to Rule 24, it served to suspend the 
time for filing the notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2004); Utah R. Crim. P. 
24(c) (2004); (Brief of Appellant, Argument, sub-part F.) The state disagrees. 
(See State's Brief, Argument, Point I.) The state maintains that the new trial motion was 
untimely, thereby rendering this Court without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. (Id.) 
In support of its position, the state relies on State v. Price, 2002 UT App 338, 
cert, denied, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003). The Court in Price stated the following: 
Patti Price [aka Preece] appeals her conviction of Operation of a Clandestine 
Laboratory, a first degree felony. 
Price filed a motion for new trial on December 6, 2000, one day prior to entry of 
the signed judgment. The trial court thereafter entered an Amended Sentence, 
Judgment, and Commitment on January 4, 2001. Later, on August 27, 2001, the 
trial court denied the prematurely filed motion for new trial. Price filed a notice of 
appeal on September 12, 2001. 
A timely motion for new trial filed under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure tolls the time for appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). Rule 24 requires a 
motion for new trial to be Mmade within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or 
within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24(c). A motion for new trial filed prior to the entry of the signed 
judgment and sentence is premature and does not toll the time for appeal. See 
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State v. Vessev. 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam). Because 
the notice of appeal was filed over eight months after entry of the final judgment, 
this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. See Varian-Eimac 
v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside 
the court's jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action."). 
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Price. 2002 UT App 338 (unpublished decision). 
The state maintains that in Price, the trial court announced on December 5, 2000, 
that it would sentence defendant; then on December 6, 2000, Price filed a new trial 
motion; and on December 7, the trial court entered judgment. (State's Brief, 11.) The 
unpublished opinion does not reflect those particular facts. Consequently, the state has 
asked this Court to take judicial notice of those facts, as set forth in select portions of the 
state's brief filed in Price. (Id., 11 and n.3.) 
Pursuant to Rule 201(b), Utah R. Evid., this Court will not take judicial notice of a 
fact subject to dispute. For judicial notice, the fact must be "generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction" of the court, or "capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(b) 
(2004). The state's interpretation of facts in Price is not proper for judicial notice. In 
addition, under Rule 201, this Court will not take judicial notice of matters in unrelated 
cases. Robison v. Kelly, 255 P. 430, 431 (Utah 1927) (stating a court cannot take judi-
cial notice of the record in a different case); Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 P.2d 618, 
620 (Utah 1933). The state has not met the standard for judicial notice under Rule 201. 
Next, the Price decision is not controlling authority for the issue here. In Horton v. 
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Goldminer's Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court identified 
what constitutes controlling authority in a matter. 
[Defendant Buehner Concrete] asserts that [the validity of the statute of repose 
under the open courts provision of the state constitution in this case] is controlled 
by Goodv. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). In Good, the Court merely 
stated that the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the statute. It did not 
specify which constitutional provisions were relied on. With no analysis, the 
opinion simply stated that "the claim is without merit." Id. at 225. The Court cited 
no authority and gave no reasons. Under these circumstances, the opinion can 
only be read to have disposed of a frivolous constitutional claim or what may have 
been a potentially meritorious constitutional claim that was presented in a 
frivolous manner. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at 683, we stated, 
"Whether the Court [in Good] in fact addressed the merits of Article I section 11 
is speculative, and the ruling, therefore, has little persuasive effect [upon the issue 
of the constitutionality of a statute of repose under Article I, section 11]." 
Accordingly, Good is not dispositive here. 
Horton, 785 P.2d at 1090; see State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, ^ 6 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (state 
relied on case law that was not dispositive). The lessons of Horton apply here. 
It is speculative to claim that, as in Todd's case, the Court in Price was asked to 
apply the rules of statutory construction to Rule 24(c) (see Todd's Brief of Appellant, 
pages 43-45 (citing, inter alia, Lvon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, %\1, 5 P.3d 616; State v. 
Ewell 883 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah App. 1993); Hansen v. Hansen . 958 P.2d 931, 934 
(Utah App. 1998))); or that the Price Court was asked to look to other jurisdictions that 
had distinguished between the imposition of sentence and entry of judgment for purposes 
of filing a timely notice of appeal (see Todd's Brief of Appellant, pages 46-47 (citing, 
inter alia, Rodarte v. State. 840 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), affd. 860 
S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Trunnel. 549 P.2d 550, 551 (Alaska 1976); 
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Kriebelv.U.S.. 10 F.2d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 1926))); or that the appellant in Price 
compared Rule 24(c) to other provisions where the drafters had specifically used the 
phrase "entry of judgment" to trigger a timely post-trial filing for purposes of the notice 
of appeal. (See Todd's Brief of Appellant, pages 45-46 (citing, inter alia, Utah R. Civ. P. 
50(b), 52(b), 59 and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (2004)).) And it is speculative to claim that 
in Price, the Court was asked to consider common sense and public policy in 
distinguishing between "imposition of sentence," which triggered the filing here, and 
entry of judgment, which occurred later. (Todd's Brief of Appellant, page 47.) 
In this case, the rules of statutory construction, case law and public policy support 
that the drafters intended Rule 24(c) to be triggered upon imposition of sentence in open 
court in the presence of the defendant. (Brief of Appellant, pages 42-47.) Here, the 
motion for a new trial was filed in accordance with the plain language of Rule 24(c). It 
served to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2004). Any 
other result would be in conflict with the plain and express language of the rule.3 
3 The state has cited to State v. Wright 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah App. 1995), cert, 
denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996), and State v. Currv. 814 P.2d 1150, 1151 (Utah App. 
1991), in its brief. (State's Brief, 12.) Those cases are not controlling authority here, for 
the reasons identified, supra, pages 20-21. In addition, they are distinguishable. 
In Wright 904 P.2d at 1102, this Court considered a double-jeopardy claim, where 
the trial court held several sentencing hearings and indicated early on that it would 
sentence defendant to probation. After later reviewing the presentence report, the court 
sentenced defendant to prison and "signed the appropriate order." Id. The Court on appeal 
rejected the double-jeopardy argument, id., and relied on Curry, 814 P.2d at 1151, which 
concerned imposition of a "more severe sentence" after defendant moved to set aside the 
original sentence. In Wright and Curry, this Court did not consider the "imposition of 
sentence" in the context of filing post-sentencing papers or a notice of appeal. Thus, those 
cases are not relevant to the analysis here. (See also Brief of Appellant, 45, note 6.) 
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2. Section 78-2a-3(l)(b) and Boggess Ensure This Court's Authority to Consider 
the Issues on Appeal in this Matter. 
The state claims that if this Court considers the notice of appeal to be untimely, the 
Court must dismiss the appeal. That would be unfair to Todd. As set forth in the opening 
Brief of Appellant, November 5, 2003, this Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion for Sum-
mary Disposition in this case, and asked the parties to state why the appeal should not be 
dismissed. (Sua Sponte Motion.) In response, Todd maintained the notice of appeal was 
timely. He asked the Court to proceed with the appeal on the merits. (See Memorandum 
in Opposition to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Dismissal, dated May 28, 2003.) 
In the alternative, Todd requested remand for resentencing nunc pro tunc so that 
he could file an amended notice of appeal before proceeding to full briefing on the 
issues. (Id.); see Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, fflfl0-l 1, 24 (resentencing is 
appropriate where a defendant, who wishes to timely appeal, files an untimely notice due 
to circumstances that are not his fault). This Court then withdrew its sua sponte motion 
and ordered full briefing. (Order, dated August 22, 2004.) There is no reason now to 
delay resolution of the appeal on the merits here. 
Assuming arguendo the notice here was untimely, controlling authority supports 
this Court's jurisdiction over the case. Pursuant to § 78-2a-3(l)(b), a remedy exists: this 
Court may issue any process necessary "in aid of its jurisdiction" over the appeal. 
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981), is in accord. There, defendant was 
convicted of manslaughter on June 19, 1978. IdL_ at 40. On January 3, 1979, defendant 
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filed a notice of appeal. Neither the parties' briefs on appeal nor the record "disclosed 
any facts explaining why defendant's appeal was submitted so far out-of-time." Id_ After 
briefing, the supreme court dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. IdL_ 
When the case was returned to the lower court, defendant filed a writ of habeas 
corpus and developed a record to reflect why the notice of appeal was untimely. Id_ at 
40. According to the record, after defendant was convicted, he advised counsel he did 
not want to appeal. When defendant arrived at the prison, he changed his mind. He 
wrote a letter to his attorney, and the attorney received the letter on "July 18th, the day 
before the time for appeal expired." IcL The attorney took no action. IcL Based on those 
facts, the habeas court granted defendant permission to file an "out-of-time appeal" and 
directed defendant "to return to the district court for further relief if [the Utah Supreme 
Court again] refused to entertain that appeal." Id. at 40. Defendant again proceeded with 
the appeal, only to have the supreme court reject it. When defendant returned again to the 
habeas court, that court entered an order to grant the habeas petition and to release the 
defendant from prison if the supreme court refused to address the substantive merits of 
the case. Id at 41. At that point in the proceedings, the state appealed. Id_ 
The supreme court considered the issues and identified an acceptable solution to 
the matter. Id at 42. Specifically, the court considered the post-conviction habeas relief 
to be appropriate when "defendant's claim is based on allegations that have not been 
established as facts." Ld (emphasis added). However, once facts supporting the reason 
for an untimely notice of appeal have been developed, "it would be needlessly circular to 
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require that defendant return to the district court to re-establish the facts by a post-
conviction hearing and then to be resentenced to qualify for a direct appeal. In this 
exceptional circumstance, there is a more direct remedy." Id. The court used the 
common-law writ4 as a basis for reaching the criminal case where the record supported 
defendant's right to appeal, and it supported that the right was compromised due to 
statutory time limits and through no fault of the defendant. IcL_ at 41-42. Boggess sup-
ports application of the common-law writ. It has broad application. It should not be read 
to support that a defendant must proceed through "the habeas corpus merry-go-round," 
kl at 41, as described there, before he may be heard on appeal in the criminal case. 
Indeed, in Boggess, the facts developed in the habeas proceedings and the 
common-law writ, opened the door for direct review. 
[W]here a timely appeal to this Court was prevented by circumstances that 
admittedly constituted a denial of defendant's constitutional rights to appeal, we 
exercise our discretion to issue the common-law writ of certiorari to bring up the 
record and allow defendant a direct review in this Court of the alleged errors in his 
trial for manslaughter, on the merits, just as if he had taken an appeal within the 
statutory period. The briefs filed by the parties in No. 16232 are hereby received 
as the briefs in this case, with either party to have leave to supplement them within 
thirty days. 
4 When Boggess was published, the Utah Constitution empowered the appellate court to 
issue the "common-law writ of certiorari" in aid of jurisdiction. Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42; 
Utah Cons. art. VIII, § 4 (1953) (stating the "Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that 
jurisdiction"). That power differed from the "various statutory enactments authorizing 
specialized uses of the writ of certiorari," in cases involving, e.g., public service 
commission orders or worker's compensation awards. Boggess. 635 P.2d at 42 & n.6. 
Today, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2) and 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002) allow the appellate 
courts to issue the writ and any process necessary in aid of their jurisdiction. 
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Id at 43. The lessons of Boggess apply here. 
The facts of record support Todd's intent to timely appeal. Todd filed a new trial 
motion within 10 days after the trial court imposed sentence in open court. (R. 678; 516-
18.) Todd filed a notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of an order on the new 
trial motion. (R. 592-94; 632-33.) To the extent the notice of appeal was untimely, it 
was through no fault of Todd. Todd respectfully urges this Court to exercise its 
discretion to issue the common-law writ of certiorari to allow direct review. Boggess , 
635 P.2d at 42-43. The briefs filed by the parties should be received for the substantive 
appeal from the criminal conviction. Li.; see also Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 681 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("More specifically, 'the authority to issue a writ in aid of appellate 
jurisdiction "is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction already 
acquired by appeal but extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction 
although no appeal has been perfected"'") (cites omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Todd respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the conviction and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of df^U , 2004. 
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